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POVERTY, AGE DISCRIMINATION, 
AND HEALTH CARE
Leslie Pickering Francis
In Euripides’ play Alcestis, Alcestis’ middle-aged husband, Admetus, is told 
by the gods that it is his turn to die next. Admetus bargains a reprieve, 
promising in exchange to find another soul to take his place. His friends all 
turn him down. So do his father and mother. Admetus rebukes his father for 
the refusal. But his father replies that life is precious to him, too: “You are 
glad to see the light; do you suppose your father isn’t?” (Hadas, 1960: 19). 
His father does not waver in the belief that he has no obligation to give up his 
life for Admetus, even though Alcestis, Admetus’ wife and mother of their 
small children, volunteers to take Admetus’ place. Alcestis, too, believes 
that “nothing is so precious as life.” She is not, however, generous in her 
evaluation of her father-in-law’s refusal to take Admetus’ place. She thinks it 
appropriate for Admetus’ parents, who had “come to a time of life fitting for 
death,” to make the sacrifice (Hadas, 1960: 9-10).
Euripides’ moral drama has a number of philosophically important fea­
tures. It concerns a basic good, perhaps the most basic good of all: life itself. 
It constructs a distribution problem in a situation of scarcity: not all can live. 
The problem involves reallocation rather than the distribution of an initially 
unattached good, for Admetus is seeking to persuade someone to die in his 
place. The characters place an extremely high value on their own continued 
existence; only Alcestis is willing to make the final altruistic sacrifice. They 
disagree, however, about the objective value to be assigned each other’s 
continued existence. This disagreement is connected to their views about the 
moral significance of age. Admetus and Alcestis think that it is appropri­
ate—indeed, obligatory—for Admetus’ parents to offer to die in his place. 
His parents believe that it is not.
The moral significance of age, primarily advancing age, is the focus of 
this paper. In the first section, I outline the contemporary relevance of the 
Alcestis theme for health care allocation and financing. In the second 
section, I explore whether age-related differences in subjective valuations of 
the goods to be distributed can support differential treatment of the elderly. If 
Admetus’ parents had found life less sweet than the younger Admetus, would 
this matter morally? In the third section, I consider whether there are age- 
based differences in the objective value of goods that can justify age-based 
differences in treatment. Have Admetus’ parents come to the time at which
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their lives are less valuable and so weigh less heavily as we frame social 
policy? In the fourth section, I take up Norman Daniels’ suggestion that age 
and health care policy should not be viewed from a single point in time but as 
a problem of rational, prudential allocation across the entire life span. In the 
final section, I look at differential treatment of the aged as a consequence of 
the egalitarian view that it is preferable, if possible, to distribute goods more 
widely rather than to concentrate them in the hands of a few. Until this final 
section, I hold aside the complication that the Alcestis story involves 
reallocation rather than the distribution of unattached goods.
C u r r e n t  Va r ia t io n s  o n  t h e  A l c e s t is  T h e m e
Present social policy in a number of areas expresses apparent am­
bivalence about the moral significance of age, both youth and old age. 
Health care distribution is a prime example. 1 Discrimination against the 
aged is prohibited and special programs for the aged are in force, yet there is 
renewed pressure for cost savings in these programs that may result in forms 
of rationing by age.
The Age Discrimination Act of 1975 prohibits age discrimination in any 
federally supported program. It allows federal programs, however, to be 
targeted to particular age groups, such as the young or the elderly. It also 
permits age to be taken into account if it is a factor necessary to the normal 
achievement of a program’s statutory objectives (42 U .S.C ., sections 
6102-03). Thus Medicare can be authorized only for those over age 65. By 
contrast, federally-supported health care programs that are, aimed at the 
general population, like Medicaid, cannot simply deny people benefits 
because they are old. General programs may, however, limit services by age 
in pursuit of statutory objectives. For example, therapy paid for by Medicaid 
might be limited by age if it is less likely to succeed in older patients.
The share of federal budgetary resources devoted to the elderly has 
nearly doubled since 1960. Almost 28 percent of federal spending for 1985 
will benefit the 11 percent of Americans age 65 and over (Senate Committee 
on Aging, 1984c: iii). Some of this spending is in programs aimed at poor 
Americans generally, such as food stamps, public housing, and legal ser­
vices. But the bulk of the spending is in two programs targeted specifically to 
the elderly— Social Security and Medicare—the two largest federal domes­
tic spending programs. It is estimated that in 1985, 55 percent of federal 
spending on the elderly will go for Social Security ($140.1 billion); 28 
percent will go for Medicare ($64.9 billion) and Medicaid ($7.5 billion) 
combined (Senate Committee on Aging, 1984c: 7).
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The next two decades may bring a 70 percent increase in the population 
aged 75 and above (Aaron and Schwartz, 1984: 113). Although increases in 
federal spending on retirement income programs have slowed, increases in 
federal spending on health care have not. Federal spending on health care for 
the elderly is projected to reach 6 percent of the gross national product by 
2030 (Senate Committee on Aging, 1984c: 20). The hospital insurance 
portion of Medicare is financed from the Social Security payroll tax and 
cannot under current law be supplemented from general revenues. The cost 
of this program was 2.97 percent of the Social Security wage base in 1982 
and is expected to nearly quadruple by the year 2035 (Aaron and Schwartz, 
1984: 113). Despite the 1983 bailout of Social Security, at current levels of 
financing the hospital insurance trust fund is expected to be depleted around 
the end of this decade and to run annual deficits of $60 billion by 1995 
(House Subcommittee on Health, 1984: 1-2).
Even more serious financing difficulties may occur in the supplementary 
medical insurance program of Medicare, which pays for out-of-hospital 
care. This program has the highest rate of expenditure increase of any 
domestic spending program; projected expenditures of $25 billion in 1985 
will represent a 16.1 percent increase over 1984 levels (Senate Committee 
on Aging, 1984b: 1). The program is financed in part by patient premiums 
and in part from general revenues. Unless premiums are increased, 5.7 
percent of general revenues will be needed for the program by 1988 (House 
Subcommittee on Health, 1984: 6).
Despite these increases, health care costs have consumed a growing 
proportion of the income of older Americans. Today, nearly half of the 
households headed by someone 65 or older have incomes of less than 
$10,000 per annum {Salt Lake Tribune, Jan. 13, 1985). Yet by 1981, the 
percentage of average per capita income paid out of pocket by the elderly for 
health care was 19.9 percent, nearly the pre-Medicare level of 20.4 percent 
(Senate Committee on Aging, 1984c: 10). These expenditures went mostly 
for out-of-hospital physician services under the supplementary insurance 
program. In some states, physicians refused to accept Medicare as payment 
in full on over 90 percent of claims, with remaining costs shifted to Medicare 
patients (Senate Committee on Aging, 1984b: 32).
Some of the cost increases may be attributed to demographic shifts. Some 
may result from unnecessary duplication or inflation of medical services. By 
far the largest portion, however, is due to advances in medical care itself. 
Estimates are that 4 percent per annum of the 12.4 percent per annum 
growth in hospital insurance spending results from increased intensity of
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service. Services like hip replacements are performed more often, and 
conditions like heart disease are treated with a growing panoply of tech­
niques (House Subcommittee on Health, 1984: 2-5). Over half of the 
increase in the supplementary medical insurance program is attributed to 
growth in the intensity of services, especially from specialists (House 
Subcommittee on Health, 1984: 6).
Proposals for reform include cutting costs of services, reducing the 
number of covered services, or shifting responsibility to beneficiaries 
(House Subcommittee on Health, 1984). All of these have some potential for 
either direct or indirect rationing of medical care to the aged. Proposed 
changes in the method of reimbursing physicians on a fee-for-service basis, 
for example, might decrease the mix of physicians accepting Medicare 
patients or assignment of Medicare claims (Senate Committee on Aging, 
1984b: 26-29, 35). Increased cost sharing by patients, depending on its 
structure, might discourage use of services (House Subcommittee on 
Health, 1984: 30-48).
To the extent that the financing crisis results from increased intensity of 
services, limits on coverage, particularly coverage of new technologies, 
may seem an increasingly attractive means to contain costs (Aaron and 
Schwartz, 1984: 119; House Subcommittee on Health, 1984: 129-48). 
Aaron and Schwartz (1984: 124) suggest that when choices get hard, the 
most likely care to be eliminated will be aggressive therapy for the termi­
nally ill, many of whom are likely to be old. Next likely are slower 
introduction of new therapy and less widespread use of expensive techniques 
like the artificial heart, especially if they require large capital expenditures 
or trained personnel (1984: 125-28).
The British do appear to ration care in these ways. Fewer resources are 
allocated in Britain to the treatment of terminal illness in intensive care units 
(Aaron and Schwartz, 1984: 96-97). Dialysis rates in Britain are approx­
imately one-quarter of rates in the United States (Aaron and Schwartz, 1984: 
33). Despite the professed rationale of medical efficacy, much of the vari­
ance appears to be explained by the age of the patient. In the words of one 
British consultant, patients over the age of 55 are “a bit crumbly” and not well 
suited for dialysis (Aaron and Schwartz, 1984: 35).
Although older patients on dialysis do experience higher death rates than 
younger patients, one may be pardoned the suspicion that this policy is in 
part supported by the feeling that age itself matters morally. It is important to 
see whether age does matter and, if so, on what moral grounds.2
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A g e  a n d  t h e  S u b j e c t i v e  Va l u e  o f  L i f e
One argument for the moral relevance of age is suggested by the comment 
of Admetus’ father that life is as sweet to him as it is to Admetus. Suppose 
that his father is highly unusual and older people value life less than younger 
people. Perhaps the difference is in life as an instrumental value, as the 
pleasures life brings shrink or give way to pain. Or perhaps life just comes to 
seem less important.
A utilitarian or indeed anyone concerned to maximize the efficient use of 
scarce resources might draw a chilling but clear implication from this 
difference. Goods are to be assigned where they will create the most 
subjective value. If this means that beef-lovers get steak, music-lovers get 
flutes, and those with the most zest for life get first crack at the means of life, 
so be it. Efficiency appears to support giving those who value life the most 
priority in the distribution of life-saving resources. If these are the young, 
then the young should have priority in the distribution of medical care.
The apparent efficiency of these assignments could be outweighed by 
other consequences —what might be called moral externalities. The effects 
of a distribution on our respect for persons, for example, might easily 
outweigh the benefits of the distribution to those actually receiving goods. 
But an argument from externalities is not the strongest way to criticize these 
provisional assignments. It leaves their initial appeal untouched. In this 
section, therefore, I explore direct reasons for concluding that the moral 
relevance of age cannot be established from differences in subjective 
valuations.
In the first place, in the case so far there is no link to age. To bring in age, 
it must be shown that there are age-related differences in the values people 
attach to life or goods to which life is instrumental. If the differences are 
uniform, age could substitute’for less easily measured subjective valuations. 
If the differences are pronounced and pervasive, but not uniform, the 
argument for age as a stand-in must rest on administrative convenience. 
Administrative convenience is a persuasive consideration when the goods at 
stake are such that we are willing to risk a less than optimal allocation in 
order to save administrative costs. Jobs, perhaps, fit this characterization; 
but life does not.
Moreover, it seems unlikely that there are such pervasive differences 
between the old and the young in the value they attach to life. What data there 
are suggest that those who have not experienced discomforts or handicaps
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are likely to give lower hypothetical evaluations of an afflicted life, than 
those who have had such experiences (Avorn, 1984). The young may think 
less of life in old age than their elders do. Thus Admetus and his father: 
Admetus expects his father to value life less than his father actually does.
Even if we found widespread differences in the subjective evaluations of 
life given by old and young, we could not take the data at face value. If the 
elderly are poor, ignored, and without supportive services (such as home 
health care), it would not be surprising for them to report valuing life less 
than those whose comfort rests on home mortgage tax deductions or pub­
licly supported schools. But to use these reports as a moral reason for the 
priority of the young would simply compound injustice.
Finally, there is a general moral concern about the use of subjective 
preferences in allocation (Scanlon, 1975). Suppose we must allocate a 
scarce life-sustaining good to one of two individuals. We discover that one 
wants the good more and that this difference does not appear to be the result 
of prior injustice, or even of remediable features of the person’s situation in 
life. To ignore the difference in intensity is to risk wasting a good on 
someone who will not make use of it. On the other hand, to let this difference 
in desire make an allocative difference is to let those with more intense 
preferences have a better chance of enjoying a good and to treat more 
moderate individuals with questionable fairness. The impact of intensity 
may seem more problematic as more basic goods are involved, such as life 
or the means of life. Health care for the elderly achieves many goods-  
comfort, mobility, the enjoyment of activities including continued fruitful 
work—intertwined with the preservation of the underlying good of life 
itself.
T h e  O b j e c t i v e  Va l u e  o f  L i f e  in  O l d  A g ei
A second argument for the relevance of age is suggested by Alcestis’ 
assertion that her father-in-law’s life is less worthwhile than the life of a 
younger person. There are several ways in which this claim might be 
understood as a claim about objective value. It might be a claim about 
instrumental value: that the old contribute less, to themselves and to others. 
Or it might be a claim about the intrinsic value of life in old age, that it is 
qualitatively inferior.
The claim about instrumental value founders on the facts, if the old 
contribute in the time-honored ways of senior statesmen. But if it does not, 
we are left with a chilling triage. As practiced in the allocation of dialysis, 
this triage came under extensive criticism (Winslow, 1982), to which I shall
122
not add here. The triage, however, is not based on age. The connection to age 
is only contingent, and the triage would likewise place lesser priority on 
health care for those at any age who are judged less valuable to society.
Much of the difficulty with the claim that life at an old age is less 
intrinsically valuable than life at an earlier stage lies in understanding it as an 
independent claim. On the one hand, it may be nothing other than the 
assertion about subjective valuations discussed in the preceding section. On 
the other hand, it may collapse into the contention to be argued for, that age 
matters morally. At worst, the claim is rank prejudice. At best, it is at odds 
with other claims we make about intrinsic value. For example, an amphora 
becomes more valuable with age, even though it has not qualitatively 
changed in ways unrelated to age. These concerns seem sufficient to place 
the burden of proof on defenders of the view that age matters morally 
because the lives of the aged are less intrinsically valuable than the lives of 
the young.
D a n ie l s  a n d  P r u d e n c e
In a series of recent papers, Norman Daniels has proposed approaching 
aging and health care from the standpoint of prudential reasoning. In 
Daniels’ view, age rationing of medical care can be justified on prudential 
grounds.
Daniels uses a Rawlsian framework.3 He imagines choosers behind the 
veil of ignorance, deprived of knowledge of their peculiarities: their race, 
sex, talents, genetic history, health status, socioeconomic position, and 
individual conceptions of the good (Daniels, 1983: 507). In the Rawlsian 
scheme, choice occurs in stages, with earlier choices constraining later 
ones. Choosers at each stage know progressively more about their society 
but remain in ignorance of themselves. A health care system is to be chosen 
at the stage when basic social institutions are selected. At this stage in the 
sequence, choosers know basic facts about their society, such as its re­
sources, level of development, and typical styles of life. They are con­
strained by prior choices of the principles of justice and their society’s 
constitutional design.
The significance of health care, Daniels argues, is to open and preserve 
opportunities. Choosers, not knowing their peculiar health needs, will be 
unable to tailor a health care system to their own best interests. They will 
know, however, the array of life plans typically constructed by people in their 
society, at all ages. Daniels calls these the “normal opportunity ranges.” He 
emphasizes that the ranges vary at different stages in the life cycle (Daniels,
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1983: 508; Daniels, 1981). For example, middle-aged individuals are likely 
to be raising children and older people to be concentrating on bringing plans 
to fruition. The choosers, Daniels concludes, will construct a health care 
system to give each a fair share of the normal opportunity range at each stage 
of life (Daniels, 1983: 510).
In our society, if we cannot afford all beneficial care, this system will not 
provide the same health care at all points in the life cycle. Impairments of 
typical species functions, from mobility to procreation, are what most 
curtail individuals’ abilities to enjoy the normal opportunity range. Likely 
impairments, however, vary with age. For example, nursing support and 
home housekeeping services have a major impact on the opportunities of the 
elderly. The choosers would provide them. Intensive care technology, in 
contrast, may avoid premature death for the young but prolong the life of the 
old only briefly. It would be rationed by age, if resources are insufficient to 
provide it for everyone (Daniels, 1984: 23-25).
Daniels is not troubled by these conclusions. To argue that they fit our 
considered moral judgments, he begins with a truism. Rich or poor, black or 
white, talented or handicapped—none can avoid the passage of time. As a 
distributive consideration, Daniels infers, age is unlike sex and race, which 
do not affect us all equally. Age distribution takes place within a life, rather 
than across lives. It is not “age-ist,” Daniels contends, to allocate different 
benefits at different points in life. Nor is it “age-ist” to impose costs dispro­
portionately on younger workers, if these workers have been higher cost 
users as children and will eventually return to the higher use categories 
themselves (Daniels, 1983: 495). Daniels would, however, regard a scheme 
as “age-ist” if it allowed some groups to gain at the expense of others 
(Daniels, 1983: 513).
Unfortunately, allocation across the life cycle is more like the problem of 
racial or sexual discrimination than Daniels admits. Time passes for us all, 
but we are not all lucky enough to age. Congenital and genetic conditions are 
ours from birth; we do not grow into them. Insofar as we become able to 
identify a genetic component in more and more illnesses —from Hunting­
ton’s chorea to hypertension to cancer of the colon—allocation across the life 
cycle comes to resemble the problem of allocation across lives. Diseases 
caused by differentially distributed environmental and cultural factors, such 
as asbestos exposure or diets low in fiber, likewise have very differential 
impact on people. Indeed, Daniels’ picture only works for conditions that we 
are all at risk for developing over a lifetime, like chicken pox or pneumonia. 
Even here, the risks are unlikely to be equal; for example, patients with
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cystic fibrosis, a genetically transmitted disease, are at far greater risk for 
pneumonia than members of the general population.
The choosers thus are not engaged in distributing resources across their 
own futures. The allocation they choose cannot be defended on the ground 
that age is fundamentally unlike race or sex as a factor in distributive justice. 
Instead, the allocation is prudential for those who, with health care, will 
enjoy a normal life span. We must therefore look to the Rawlsian scheme 
itself to justify age-related allocation. As Daniels reconstructs the scheme, it 
yields age-related allocations but in a morally unacceptable manner. The 
difficulty is that age bias is built into the central notion of a normal oppor­
tunity range.
In Daniels’ view, the notion of a normal opportunity range is the 
benchmark that enables choosers to design a health care system. Without it, 
choosers would need another benchmark against which to decide what kinds 
of health care should be provided. But alternatives do not seem promising. 
Knowledge of their own needs would introduce individual bias. Designing 
health care to ameliorate the situation of the worst-off individual risks 
commitment of unlimited resources for little gain.
As Daniels characterizes it, the age-related normal opportunity range for 
a given society—the array of life plans that reasonable persons in that society 
are likely to construct for themselves at a given stage of life —is relative to 
wealth and cultural values (Rawls [1971: 199] also includes knowledge of 
cultural practices when social institutions are chosen). Now, we can imagine 
a culture (call it “Lamms-ville”) in which old people believe it is in their 
interests and is their responsibility to die. They make no plans, except for 
graceful deaths and inexpensive funerals. It seems perverse to refer to these 
plans as the normal opportunity range for the elderly in Lamms-ville. Yet in 
Daniels’ account, they would delineate the range.
A possible solution is to use the veil of ignorance to block out knowledge 
of such cultural practices. The choice of a health plan takes place at the stage 
of selecting institutions, when individuals know facts about their society 
such as average life spans. Although cultural practices and life spans are 
intertwined, one could try to construct an account of opportunity ranges that 
is independent of culture such as that found in Lamms-ville.
But what would the account look like? Age-related differences in oppor­
tunity ranges could not reflect differences in the patterns of life plans that are 
the result of what is generally done in the society. Thus they could not reflect 
differences in social practices like a standard retirement age. Nor, although 
the choosers do know the general economic constraints faced by their
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society, could the opportunity ranges reflect economic allocations such as 
the generally more limited incomes of older people. Otherwise, the design 
of the health care system would be constrained by the very economic choices 
that are at issue. The normal opportunity range could still reflect differences 
in physical capacity, to the extent that these are not induced by social 
choices. For example, they could include the observation that childbearing 
for women ceases to become possible after menopause. But these are the 
only differences they could reflect.
A health care system designed on this basis would certainly differentiate 
care by age relative to physical changes over the life cycle. Just as it would 
provide pediatric care for the young, it would provide geriatric care to the 
elderly. But this is only to provide care based on medical appropriateness, 
not to ration by age. Nor are there grounds for thinking that the choosers 
would age ration in any further sense, for the choosers have no knowledge of 
which of the panoply of physically available plans they will want to pursue at 
any stage of life.
Daniels does not, therefore, provide an argument from prudence to the 
relevance of age. This is not to reject his conclusions: it seems entirely 
sensible to improve home health services to the elderly, as well as to others 
who need them, and to limit marginally beneficial intensive care. But these 
conclusions are a matter of the optimal use of resources, not of age.
E g a l it a r i a n is m  a n d  A g e
The final argument for the relevance of age that I shall discuss in this 
paper is a kind of strict egalitarianism. Suppose we believe that, other 
considerations aside, the fact that one person has enjoyed more of a good 
than a second is a moral reason for giving the second preference when the 
next distribution occurs. Those who are older have, by definition, had more 
of the good of being alive than those who are younger. Health care may be a 
crucial means of life. Then the fact that someone is expected to have a 
shortened life span would be a moral reason for giving him priority in the 
distribution of life-sustaining health care over someone who has already 
lived four score and ten4 (Menzel, 1983:188; Veatch, 1979: 211). This is the 
most straightforward argument for an age cutoff in health care: age means 
having had more of the good of life. The serious questions about the 
argument rest in whether the egalitarianism it represents is either a very 
clear or a very compelling moral concern.
First, clarity. Is the egalitarianism on which the argument rests equal
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distribution of life, of the means of life, or of the package of goods 
experienced during life, and why? Compare two candidates for life-saving 
therapy, one of whom is younger but who has consumed a much greater 
share of social resources for health care. Compare these two with a third who 
is younger still but already has had a far more fulfilling life.
These case-by-case comparisons are a morass. But the egalitarian can 
avoid them. Part of the critical thrust of the examples just given is that when 
we consider the distribution of health care in the United States today, we are 
designing social policy for a situation of partial compliance. Unjust distribu­
tions of other goods, or even of prior access to health care, may already have 
shaped the lives of those in need of care. For example, someone less well off 
may have had to make greater demands on the health care system earlier in 
life.5 Someone else may have lived a more fulfilling life because he began 
with more than his fair share of social resources. Even leaving aside 
differences in what Rawls (1971) calls the natural lottery, if this background 
of social injustice is serious enough, a move towards egalitarianism only 
compounds the injustice done to truncated lives.
Background injustice, however, is not the only factor involved in the 
appeal of individualized comparisons. Ill-health, job satisfaction, family 
life—all are at least somewhat a matter of luck. One way to clarify the 
egalitarian intuition is to focus it on the distribution of a few basic goods, 
such as life and the means of life. This clarification ignores all these other 
underlying individualized differences.
But the price of clarification may be that egalitarianism seems less 
compelling, because of the focus on basic goods. Egalitarianism may also 
not seem very compelling in light of other moral considerations. Efficiency 
matters. So may background features of the situation such as whether any 
promises have been made about enjoyment of the good or whether the 
distribution is a reallocation affecting entrenched expectations. The sug­
gestion is just that egalitarianism is an argument for taking age into account, 
not that it should be morally determinative.
I do not find these difficulties with egalitarianism overwhelming. There 
are those who will find them so. Nonetheless, it is important to know that the 
best argument for age rationing in the distribution of health care, ironically, 
is an egalitarianism many will find unacceptable.
University o f  Utah
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1. Employment policy is another example. In 1978, the statutory ceiling of 
protection from mandatory retirement was raised to age 70. This passage of the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. 95-256, 92 Stat. 
189, has spawned extensive debate over age as a bona fide occupational qualification. 
See, for example, Note, “Age Discrimination in Retirement: In Search of an 
Alternative,” 1984. The protection of seniority is a major limit on other federal 
antidiscrimination policy, given augmented significance in the Supreme Court’s 
holding last term that routine application of a seniority system that results in layoffs of 
more recently hired minority workers is permissible, absent proof of discriminatory 
intent. See Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 52 U.S.L.W 4767 (1984). 
Although seniority is not necessarily correlated with age, the Memphis Firefighters 
decision seems sure to generate renewed scrutiny of the role of older workers.
2. This paper only considers direct arguments for the significance of age. There 
are also arguments that age is indirectly relevant to health care distribution. For 
example, the Stanford heart transplant program was initially limited to younger 
patients, because at the time transplants were unlikely to succeed in older patients. 
As medical skill advances, however, the medical justification for the age cutoff 
erodes, and age itself becomes more prominent as a justifying factor.
The paper is also limited to arguments for age as a cutoff. There may be reasons 
why we should provide more medical care to the elderly than to those at any other 
stage of life—for example, that the elderly deserve our extra concern because of the 
contributions they have made to society over their lifetimes. I do not discuss these 
arguments here.
3. Prudential reasoning ex ante, with full knowledge of lifetime health needs, will 
not yield consensus on age rationing. Those who know they will need otherwise 
unavailable care at younger ages will find age rationing in their interests. But those 
who know they will be healthy when young will prefer to defer resources to later 
stages. If the choice of health care is made ex post, choosers can be expected to 
demand health care when they find themselves in need of it. Daniels’ use of Rawls is 
thus the most promising defense of age rationing on prudential grounds.
4. Similarly, other considerations aside, the fact that someone has worked at a 
valued job for a longer period of time would be a reason for letting someone else have 
first crack at the next assignment. This kind of egalitarianism cuts for mandatory 
retirement and against seniority. It has been used by Michael Perry (1981) in defense 
of the claim that mandatory retirement does not violate equal protection, although 
Perry attempts to explain the claim as a consequence of the moral status of the older 
person.
5. Employment policy is full of similar cases. For example, a woman approaching 
retirement age may have had few years to enjoy a job, because discrimination 
discouraged her earlier entry into the labor market.
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